within a Tiebout setting. 
, Third, we explore more thoroughly the following Nelson's specification, estimate source of the negative correlation bethe relationship between local governtween the number of jurisdictions and loment share and number ofjurisdictions at cal government size by extending prevarious levels of aggregation and find it vious analyses in two ways. First, we to be negative and statistically signifiaccount for the correlation among the three cant at the county and SMSA levels but types of jurisdictions by estimating the not at the state level. Zax (1988 Zax ( , 1989 , behavior of each within a system of equausing county-level data, also finds a neg-tions using Zellner's seemingly unrelated ative and statistically significant correestimation technique. Correlation among lation between number of jurisdictions and the various types of jurisdictions within a local government own-source revenue per metropolitan area may result from impersonal income.
plicit or explicit sharing arrangements of In order to provide a more precise es-fimctional responsibilities. Second, we use timation of the competition hypothesis, we both measures of public sector size that incorporate three modifications to the ba-appear in the literature. Oates, Zax and sic model used by Oates, Nelson, Zax, and Nelson use own-source local revenues as Eberts and Gronberg. First, we offer more a measure of public sector size, Eberts and precise measures of government strucGronberg use expenditures, and Nelson ture. As noted by Fischel (1981) , both the uses both. Since expenditures and revesize distribution and the total number of nues are highly correlated and neither one local government units are important in can claim a more convincing theoretical assessing the competitiveness of local justification, we estimate the effect of government structure. We incorporate government structure on each of the govseparate measures of fragxnentation and emment size measures. concentration into the estimating model.
Our results, based on 218 SMSAs in Second, we consider the possibility that 1977, provide support for the fragmentadifferent types of local governments (e.g., tion/decentralization hypothesis for both suburban, central city, county, etc.) may suburbs and central cities. An increase in respond differently to the disciplining ef-the number of municipal governments per fects of market structure within a metcapita reduces the size of all three types ropolitan area. Sjoquist (1982) finds that of local governments, regardless of which the total number of local municipalities measure of size is used. An increase in the has a negative and statistically significoncentration index for the suburban locant effect on the expenditures per capita cal public sector is found to be positively of central cities. Forbes and Zampelli related to own-source revenues per per-(1989) find the opposite relationship for sonal income. Furthermore, the behavcounties. The number of counties within ioral response to market structure varies an SMSA has a positive and statistically significantly between suburbs and censignificant effect on county governments' tral cities. These findings establish addishare of personal income. Zax (1989), on tional evidence for an empirical connecthe other hand, finds that when all gov-tion between the structure of the local errunents within the county are aggrepublic service market and its perforgated to the county level, the number of mance. jurisdictions within the county is negatively correlated with local government 11. Measuring Local Government own-source revenues per personal in-Size and Market Structure come. Considering three types of local governments-municipalities (other than The conceptual experiment in this pacentral cities), central cities, and all oth-per is to compare local public sector size among otherwise identical SMSAs that municipally-provided services is meadiffer in structural arrangements for de-sured in two dimensions: fragmentation livering local public services. Empirical and concentration. Fragmentation is deimplementation of such a comparison thus fined as the number of government units faces three critical issues: 1) the mea-within an SMSA per capita and includes surement of size, 2) the measurement of two measures-one for municipalities structure, and 3) the identification of key (both suburbs and central cities) and one factors that differ across SMSAs and im-for other jurisdictions (independent school pact public sector size but are not related districts, counties, and special districts).' to market structure. Table 1 illustrates the considerable variOur empirical approach begins by di-ation across 20 large SMSAs in the deviding the SMSA into three local public gree of fragmentation as measured by the subsectors: suburban municipalities, number of municipalities per capita. central city, and other jurisdictions (e.g.,
The concentration of suburban populaspecial districts, counties). For each sub-tion among the four largest suburban sector we construct two alternative meamunicipalities is also considered. Borrowsures of size: own-source revenues and ex-ing from the industrial organization litpenditures (both divided by personal erature, Fischel (1981) promotes the use income). Own-source revenues, which are of a four-city concentration index in order defined as the revenue generated from a to capture the relative competitiveness of local government's own tax base and not suburban local government structure. received as grants from other governFischel argues that the number of cities ments, measures the allocation of local alone may not accurately represent the resources to the local public service mardegree of competition in the public goods ket. Expenditures on a common set of market. He constructs such an index for functions within each subsector measures the 25 largest urban areas in 1970 based 2 the commitment of resources to those spe-on concentration with respect to land area. cific expenditure categories, independent Our concentration index is calculated as of the source of funds. These functions in-the ratio of the population of the four most clude fire, police, parks, and sanitation. populated suburban municipalities to the Income shares of municipal own-source total suburban population (i.e., total SMSA revenues and expenditures for 20 large population minus central-city populaSMSAs for the 1976-77 fiscal year are tion). A population-based concentration shown in table 1. measure seems more appropriate than one Several refinements to defining market based on land area when addressing the structure are examined in this analysis.
impact of structure on the delivery of loFirst, we chose the SMSA as the unit of cal public services.' Table 2 contrasts the observation for the local public-sector land-based with the population-based market. Within a Tiebout framework, concentration measure for Fischel's group competition among jurisdictional supof 25 large urban areas. pliers of local public goods is fostered by In addition to measuring the competithe mobility of consumer-voters.
Close tive structure within the suburban subcompetitors are defined in spatial terms. market, the relative monopoly power of The choice of the SMSA as the relevant the central city vis-bl-vis suburbs is used spatial market within which alternative to explain government size. The centralmunicipal suppliers compete is motivated city concentration index is measured as largely from a belief that the increased the fraction of total SMSA population redispersion of employment opportunities siding in the central city. Concentration within SMSAs has increased the viability values for central cities of the 20 large of residential sites outside the core urban SMSAs are displayed in Table 1 . areas of SMSAS. This obviates Fischel's According to the decentralization hyobjection to the use of an SMSA market pothesis, increased fragmentation should definition rather than an Urban-Area lead to a greater choice for taxpayers and definition.
thus greater competition among local Second, the structure of the market for governments, resulting in a decrease in the relative size of both the central city school and college graduates, percentage and the suburban public sectors. Compeof Democratic votes in presidential electition may be mitigated by an increase in tions, percentage of owner-occupied houses, the four-suburb concentration ratio or by unemployment rate, percentage of popuan increase in the central city's share of lation that is nonwhite, and percentage of SMSA population.
The concentration population that is below the poverty level. measures are also expected to have posi-Regional dummy variables are included tive effects across submarkets, since the to account for possible differences in govdisciplining action is based on the options emment structure and functions of govopen to households and increased concenernment jurisdictions across census retration, ceteris paribus, effectively re-gions. A measure of the number of local duces options.
expenditure fimctions mandated by the To control for differences among local state is also included.' The average popjurisdictions in preferences, in economies ulation of suburbs and special districts and of scale, and in the ease of delivery of ser-the population of central cities are envices, SMSA-level demographic variables tered in the appropriate equations in orand regional dummy variables are in-der to account for possible economies of cluded in the estimation equations. The scale. In addition, income per capita and demographic variables are similar to those the ratio of intergovernmental grants to used by Zax (1989) effect of outside revenue sources on their ror structure is correlated across equafiscal behavior.
tions, and thus Zellner's seemingly The scope of services (i.e., the number unrelated technique is used to estimate of functions) provided by local governthe size equations of the three types of ments, and therefore their size, also de-governments: suburbs, central cities, and pends on overlapping functional responspecial districts.' sibilities among local jurisdictions. For example, if within a metropolitan area 111. Empirical Analysis sanitation functions are performed by a special district or by the central city, then
Our data set consists of observations on suburban governments would spend less, local public-sector characteristics of 218 and perhaps collect less revenue than othSMSAs for fiscal year 1977.' Estimates of erwise comparable suburban governthe suburban, central city, and other govments located in a metropolitan area with emment equations are shown in Table 3 . a different distribution of functional re-The results support the fragmentation/ sponsibilities. Therefore, expenditures (and decentralization hypothesis. As expected, revenues) of one government may be re-the number of municipalities per capita lated to expenditures (and revenues) of a has a negative and statistically signifineighboring jurisdiction. This relationcant effect on all three types of local gov- mographic variables and regional dumThe difference in statistical signifimies in models B and C improves the fit cance across model specifications for each of the overall equation but reduces the magnitude of the point estimates, renderHowever, when size is measured by exing some coefficients that were statistipenditures within the four categories, the cally significant in model A to be statisfour-suburb concentration ratio has a tically insignificant in model C. negative effect on central cities and a The number of single-purpose districts negative but small effect on other juris-(school districts, counties, and special disdictions. The difference in estimated eftricts) per 1000 capita has mixed effects.
fects could result from the inclusiveness For other jurisdictions, which include of own-source revenues as a measure of school districts, counties, and special dislocal government size and the importance tricts, an increase in single-purpose disof the scope of government services as a tricts increases the aggregate size of these dimension of government size-elements governments when size is measured by which are not reflected in the expendiown-source revenues.
These results are ture measure used in the analysis. consistent with Nelson (1987) and Forbes
The central-city concentration ratio has and Zampelli (1989). The former finds that a negative and statistically significant efa proliferation of special districts, which fect on suburban governments for all usually provide specialized services to the specifications. Estimates indicate that as SMSA, increases the size of the local govthe central city becomes more dominant emment sector. The latter find that an in an SMSA (i.e., its share of SMSA popincrease in the number of counties in an ulation increases), the size of suburban SMSA is also associated with an increase governments decreases. A negative relain the ratio of county expenditures to pertionship is also found between central-city sonal income. concentration and the size of the centralHowever, when size is measured by excity government. 
